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Non-technical summary
An industry exhibits network externalities when the benefit that consumers enjoy from
purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers that use
the same and/or compatible products (e.g. software, operating systems, consumer elec-
tronics, telecommunications, etc.). The goods produced in these industries (i.e. network
goods) are characterized by two features closely related, durability and rapid technolog-
ical progress. Durability implies that these goods tend to ”wear out” not as a result of
physical deterioration, but as a consequence of technical obsolescence; a feature due to
technological progress. For example, a given software can be functional for a long time.
However, the utility derived by its use tends to be dissipated due to new developments
that are more closely related to consumers’ needs and tastes.
The economic consequences of durability are profound. Specifically, durability implies
that firms’ strategies attempt at extracting consumers’ current and future surplus. How-
ever, firms’ long-term strategies that affect consumers’ future surplus and future profits
(e.g. R&D investments) might conflict with short-term strategies that determine current
profits (e.g. prices). For example, by innovating too much, a firm might reduce the will-
ingness to pay (i.e. demand) of current consumers realizing that the offered good will
rapidly become obsolete.
This paper analyzes a stylized network industry where durability and technological
progress are considered together. In particular, the paper proposes a model of R&D
competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant and considers the implications
of the durability of network goods (i.e. conflicts between firms’ short-term and long-term
strategies). The main objective is to isolate the role of network externalities and analyze
the social efficiency of the R&D incentives of the firms in this industry.
The paper shows three main results. First, the threat of entry eliminates the conflict,
due to durability, between short-term pricing and R&D investment of a monopolist. This
result follows from the role that R&D incentives play in deterring entry. Second, the levels
of R&D determined by market outcome might differ from the socially optimal levels. In
particular, a potential entrant always over-invests and an established incumbent might
exhibit higher, lower or equal R&D levels in comparison with the social optimum. And
third, the extent of network externalities is the crucial parameter in the efficiency (i.e.
comparison with the socially optimal solution) of the incumbent R&D level.
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Abstract
We develop a model of R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential
entrant with network externalities and durable goods. We show that the threat of
entry eliminates the commitment problem that an incumbent may face in its R&D
decision due to the goods’ durability. Moreover, a potential entrant over-invests
in R&D and an established incumbent might exhibit higher, equal or lower R&D
investments in comparison with the social optimum. In our model, the incumbent’s
commitment problem and the efficiency of its R&D level are determined by the
extent of the network externalities.
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1 Introduction
An industry exhibits network externalities when the benefit that consumers enjoy from
purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers that
use the same and/or compatible products. For the firms in those sectors (e.g. software,
telecommunications, consumer electronics, etc.), the presence of network externalities
implies that the attractivenss of their products is a function of their quality-adjusted
prices and the potential benefit attached to their expected network sizes (i.e. installed
bases).1
Those products (i.e. network goods) tend to be characterized by two features closely
related. Durability and rapid technological progress.2 Durability implies that network
goods tend to ”wear out” not as a result of physical deterioration, but as a consequence
of technical obsolescence; a feature due to technological progress. For example, a given
software (or mobile phone, or video game, etc.) can be functional for a long time. However,
the utility derived by its use tends to be dissipated due to new (and actually very frequent)
developments that are more closely related to consumers’ needs and tastes.
This paper considers a stylized network industry where these two features, durability
and technological progress, are analyzed together. In particular, we propose a model
of R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant and consider the
implications of the durability of network goods. Our main objective is to isolate the role
of network externalities and analyze the social efficiency of the R&D incentives of the
firms in this industry.
We depart from the current literature by considering, simultaneously, an oligopolistic
setup, endogenous R&D processes and durable goods. Therefore, this paper is not only
closely related to the literature on durable goods and to the literature on technological
progress in network industries, but represents a first step in bridge them together.
The economic literature has highlighted the role that durability plays in the evolution
of a market dominated by a monopolist. In particular, after serving the current market,
the monopolist is tempted to reduce its price to attract the portion of the market that
did not buy initially. However, rational consumers anticipate this behavior and, specially
1See Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrel and Saloner (1985, 1986) for seminal treatments, and
Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Economides (1996) for surveys on network markets.
2See Katz and Shapiro (1999) for an informal analysis of antitrust in software markets, where these
two characteristics are explicitly considered.
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those with low valuations of the offered good, will wait until the price is reduced. As a
consequence, a commitment of ”no future price reductions” would increase the monopo-
list’s profits. The fact that in the absence of commitment the monopolist may act against
his own profitability implies a ”time-inconsistency” problem (i.e. choices that maximize
current profitability might not maximize overall profitability).
This situation was first discussed by Coase (1972) and has been labelled as the ”Coase
Conjecture”.3 Since its formulation, the Coase Conjecture has been theoretically devel-
oped in several papers that evaluate the robustness of the basic observation.4
The problem is that the monopolist’s future actions provide competition for the com-
pany in the current market.5 As has been suggested in the literature, if the monopolist is
able to lease the good, distort technology or implement buy back procedures then more
profit can be extracted from the market since these strategies restrict the aftermarket.6
In other circumstances, the monopolist might have an incentive to reduce durability or
make the good obsolete after a period of time.7 The existing analysis of durability in the
presence of network externalities has intended, as the main literature on durability, to
verify the validity of the Coase Conjecture.8
However, the implications of durability are much broader than the pricing commitment
problem considered in the analysis of the Coase Conjecture. In particular, the result that
a monopolist in the absence of commitment may affect its own overall profitability applies
in several contexts. In fact, as pointed out by Waldman (2003), any present and future
action that affects the future (relative) value of the monopolist’s used goods might be
subject to the ”time-inconsistency” described above. One leading case of such actions
is a firm’s R&D expenditures which, by definition, affect the (relative) value of used (or
previously sold) goods.9
In the presence of network externalities, the similar analysis of introduction of new
3Strictly, the Coase Conjecture refers to a limiting case. It states that in the absence of commitment
and if the monopolist may adjust its prices frequently enough, the successive price reductions lead to
marginal cost pricing and the subsequent loss of market power.
4See, for example, Bagnoli, Salant and Swierzbinski (1989), Bulow (1982), Gul, Sonnenschein and
Wilson (1986), and Stokey (1981).
5The price of a durable good attempts to extract current and future surplus, however, future surplus
depends on future actions that are not realized when the price is set.
6See Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), Kahn (1986) and Waldman (1997).
7See Bulow (1986), Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), Rust (1986) and Waldman (1993), Grout and Park
(2005).
8See Bensaid and Lesne (1996), Cabral et al. (1999) and Mason (2000).
9See Waldman (1996), Fishman and Rob (2000) and Nahm (2004).
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durable goods has been analyzed.10 However, this literature is focused on a monopolistic
setup and considers the production of new technologies as exogenous. Hence, and to
the best of our knowledge, there is no analysis that considers explicitly the process of
endogenous R&D processes in the presence of network externalities and durable goods.
The paper presented by Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) is the closest to ours and is
actually our departure point. In that paper, the authors consider a monopolist that
operates in a two-period framework and produces durable network goods. In the first
period the monopolist produces a good with a given low quality and, subsequently, has
the choice of introducing an improved version in the second period. Network externalities
play a role because the improvement of the old good implies backward compatibility.
That is, consumers of the new good enjoy network benefits from the entire population,
while consumers of the old good only enjoy network benefits from consumers of the same
good.11
In their model, there is an inflow of new consumers in the second period and, with
consumer homogeneity, the paper shows that the monopolist has the incentive to introduce
the improved good, even though the monopolist’s overall profits (and social surplus) is
reduced. That is, in the absence of commitment the monopolist’s choice that maximizes
current (second period) profits does not maximize overall profitability.
We present a model that extends that of Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) by introducing
and endogenous R&D process in the production of the new technology, and consider the
role of a potential entrant. We show results not present in the Ellison and Fudenberg
(2000) analysis. In particular, we consider a two-period framework with an incumbent,
a potential entrant and an inflow of new consumers. Consumers are homogeneous and
participate in a market with durable network goods.
In the first period, there is a first group of consumers that buy a network good from
the established incumbent. Before the second period starts, a potential entrant appears in
the market and, jointly with the incumbent, decides on an investment level that will allow
him to compete in the second period. This R&D process is stochastic. By investing a
certain amount, both firms, incumbent and entrant, determine the probability that in the
second period they are able to produce a new product that is quality-improved relative
to the existing good produced by the incumbent. Conditional on the success or failure
10See Choi (1994) and Ellison and Fudenberg (2000).
11A case of this situation was evidenced by the launch of Microsoft Word 97. Consumers of Word97
were fully compatible with consumers of Word95 but the opposite did not hold.
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of the innovation process, both firms compete in price in the second period when a new
group of consumers arrive.
We analyze the incentives to innovate for both firms, we compare it to the social opti-
mum and investigate the role of the network externalities. With our simplified approach,
we are able to isolate the impact of network externalities and reach three main results.12
First, the threat of entry reverses the commitment problem that a monopolist (without
such threat) may face in its R&D decision given good durability. This result is not present
in the current literature and follows from the role that R&D incentives play in deterring
entry. In our case, the monopolist’s commitment problem arises only due to the presence
of network externalities.
Second, the levels of R&D determined by market outcome might differ from the so-
cially optimal levels. In particular, a potential entrant always over-invests (as an entry
strategy) and an established incumbent might exhibit higher, lower or equal R&D levels
in comparison with the social optimum. This result suggests that successful entry takes
place too often in comparison with the social optimum.
And third, the extent of network externalities is the crucial parameter in the efficiency
of the incumbent R&D level. In fact, it is only the presence of network externalities
that permits, potentially, to the established incumbent to provide an efficient level of
innovation. Without network externalities (or very low network effects), it is shown that
the incumbent firm always under-invests in R&D efforts. This result sheds some light
on the debate whether a dominant incumbent in a network industry provides sufficient
innovation to the society.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
3 presents the analysis of its equilibrium. Section 4 computes the social optimum and
compares it with the results of the market outcome. Finally, section 5 concludes and
discusses some areas of further research.
12The robustness of these results with respect to the assumed functional forms is the objective of
current work.
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2 The Model
We consider a model of a network industry with durable goods based on that of Ellison
and Fudenberg (2000).13 There are two periods denoted by t = 1 and t = 2 with a group
of homogeneous consumers arriving in each period. In period 1 there is a monopolist
incumbent that is challenged in period 2 by a potential entrant. In period 2, firms
compete in prices with quality differentiated products. Quality is determined through
endogenous and stochastic R&D processes carried out in period 1.
2.1 Supply Side and R&D Process
In period 1, an incumbent monopolist, I, produces a durable network good with quality
level q1 (i.e. stand-alone value). The good lasts two periods after which it vanishes.
We consider the case of product innovations where, subject to R&D expenditures, the
incumbent might be able to produce a network good of better quality to be introduced
in period 2. In our model, this process of innovation is carried out at the end of period
1. In addition, we assume that the outcome of the R&D process is stochastic with two
possible outcomes, success or failure. This outcome is realized at the beginning of period
2.
In particular, we consider an R&D process where the incumbent firm determines the
probability sI that the innovation process is successful. Higher investments (i.e. higher
probability of success) entail higher costs. These costs are summarized by means of a
function C(sI) that is increasing in the probability of success sI . For simplicity, we
assume that C(sI) =
as2I
2
, where a is a cost parameter.
In the case of success, the innovation is achieved and allows the incumbent firm to
produce a ”new” network good with quality q2 in period 2, where q2 = q1 + q∆ and q∆ is
the extent of the innovation. q∆ is assumed to be constant and greater than zero. If the
innovation process is unsuccessful, the incumbent produces in period 2 the same ”old”
good with low quality q1. It is assumed that the achievement of the innovation do not
preclude the incumbent to produce the ”old” good in period 2.
In addition, we introduce a potential entrant, E, that intends to compete with the
incumbent in period 2. In order to be able to enter the market, the potential entrant must
13We construct our model to make Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) a particular case of the one presented
here. A more general version is work in progress.
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invest in R&D to develop a network good. The entrant’s innovation process takes place
simultaneously with that of the incumbent firm. It is assumed, that the innovation process
for the potential entrant is identical to the one of the incumbent firm. Therefore, the
potential entrant must determine the probability sE, that its innovation process succeeds.
If so, the entrant is able to produce the ”new” good with quality q2 in period 2. It is
assumed that in the case of unsuccessful innovation, the entrant firm stays out of the
market (i.e. it cannot produce the old quality network good).
As in Ellison and Fudenberg (2000), we assume that the network goods are backward
compatible. That is, consumers of the new good enjoy network benefits from all users
(i.e. users of new and old goods), while consumers of the old good only enjoy network
benefits from consumers of the same good (e.g. Word97 vs. Word95).14
It is further assumed that the firms cannot change the quality of the goods once they
are already produced. Marginal costs of production are independent of quality and set
equal to zero. For simplicity the discount factor is equal among firms and normalized to
1.
2.2 Demand Side and Expectation Formation Process
The demand side represents the core of the model. In each period there is a group of
Nt homogeneous consumers arriving in the market and, for convenience, we normalize
N1 + N2 = 1. Consumers exhibit a per-period unitary demand for a network good and
buy as soon as they reach the market. This implies that the N1 consumers make purchase
decisions in period 1 and in period 2. Given durability, this is not a trivial implication.
To see this, note that the price charged to the N1 consumers in period 1 tries to extract
period 1 and 2 surpluses (i.e. the good is durable). However, period 2 surplus is affected
by the outcome of the R&D processes, the prices of the two firms in period 2 and the
N1 and N2 consumers’ choices. Therefore, the willingness to pay of the N1 consumers in
period 1 depends on their beliefs on how the firms are going to behave in period 2. This
gives rise to the commitment problem discussed in the introduction.
Consider first period 1. The first group of consumers, with size N1, arrives at the
beginning of period 1, finds only the incumbent’s good and observes its price (to be
14Note that the assumption of backward compatibility implies that, conditional on successful inno-
vation, the surplus offered by the new good is independent of the identity of the firm that produces
it.
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derived below). We model utility by assuming that each consumer in N1 derives a first-
period benefit (gross of price) from buying from the incumbent firm given by q1+αx− c.
In this expression, q1 is the quality of the good, α is a parameter that measures the extent
of the network benefits, x is the number of users of compatible goods15 and c is a cost of
learning to use the network good. We introduce the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. 2q1 > 0. N1 always consume the old good in period 1.
By introducing assumption 1, the model implies that even in the case where network
benefits are equal to zero, first period consumers always consume. This assumption will
allow us to analyze the model with very small (or non-existent) network benefits and
compare the results with the case where network externalities are important without
introducing discontinuities in the consumers’ behavior.
Assumption 2. q1 + αN1 − cu > 0. It is optimal for N1 to consume in both periods.
The previous assumption 2 is introduced to avoid the possibility of N1 consumers
waiting to period 2 to consume.16 This assumption reduces the number of cases to be
analyzed, and allows us to focus on the results we are interested in.17
Of course, the overall benefit enjoyed by consumers in N1 also depends on period 2
choices to be explained below. Note that at the beginning of period 2, the outcome of the
innovation process is realized depending on the investment decisions. Hence, there are
four possible cases in period 2; no firm innovates; only the incumbent or only the entrant
innovates; and both firms achieve the innovation.
Now consider period 2. When the N1 consumers reach the beginning of period 2,
they observe the outcome of the innovation process. If the innovation is achieved, the
N1 consumers evaluate the incremental utility from purchasing (i.e. upgrading to) the
new generation of the good and decide accordingly.18 Therefore, they compare the benefit
(gross of price) from the new good q2 + α(N2 + x)− cu with the second-period benefit of
staying with the old good q1 + αx. cu is the cost of learning to use the new generation
15Note that given the homogeneity of the consumers x = N1 in period 1.
16In order to maintain the order of the exposition, the parameter cu (i.e. the cost of upgrading) is
introduced below.
17See, for example, Choi and Thum (1998) for the analysis when consumers can wait to adopt a network
good.
18Recall that for the N1 consumers the identity of the firms that produces the new good in period 2 is
irrelevant (footnote 14).
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(i.e. cost of upgrading). It is assumed that cu < c. As common in models with network
externalities, the equilibrium value of x depends on the way consumers form expectations
about other consumers behavior.
We assume that consumers are able to coordinate on the outcome that maximize their
surplus (i.e. Pareto-Optimal coordination equilibrium).19 In other words, consumers
are able to coordinate on the choice that maximize joint surplus. Thus, they compare
q2 + α− cu with q1 + αN1 and, in consequence, the incremental utility from upgrading is
given by q∆+αN2−cu. Hence, whenever q∆+αN2−cu > 0 upgrade by the N1 consumers
takes place, otherwise the N1 consumers do not buy the new good and stay with the old
one. We denote this (candidate) price of upgrading as pu.
In period 2, a second group of consumers with sizeN2 arrives in the market. This group
of consumers observes the outcome of the innovation process, observes prices (to be derived
below) and makes purchase decisions. In particular, it is assumed that whenever the
innovation is successful (either by the incumbent, the entrant or both) the N2 consumers
do not exhibit any preference for the old good produced by the incumbent. That is,
the willingness to pay of N2 consumers for the new generation of the good is equal to
q2 + α − c.20 We denote this (candidate) price as pn. Note that given the assumption of
backward compatibility, consumers of the new good enjoy the full network benefits (i.e
αx with x = 1).
In the case that the innovation does not take place (i.e. no firm innovates), the N2
consumers decides for the old good with a willingness to pay equal to q1+α−c. We denote
this (candidate) price as po. Therefore, analogous to Ellison and Fudenberg (2000), it is
the choice of the N1 consumers in period 2 that represents the most important part of
the analysis.
In the next section we present the main results of the market outcome.
3 Market Outcome
In this section we consider the optimal pricing decisions and the two firms’ private incen-
tives to innovate. As a benchmark, we consider first the monopoly case. This analysis will
19See Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Farrell and Katz (2005).
20This assumption allows the incumbent monopolist to extract the full consumers surplus in the case
without entry. Therefore, it permits us to conclude that any reduction in the monopolist’s profit implies
a reduction in social welfare.
10
allow us to compare the present paper with the current literature, to analyze the impact
of network externalities and highlight the main results we obtain in comparison with Elli-
son and Fudenberg (2000). Once the monopoly case is considered, we analyze the model
where the incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry. In both cases, we consider the
commitment as well as the no commitment case given its role in the durability literature
discussed in the introduction.
As has been widely highlighted in the literature, the no commitment case is equivalent
to focus on the Subgame-Perfect Nash-Equilibrium (SPNE), and the commitment case
corresponds to the Nash-Equilibrium (NE) of the global multi-stage game.
3.1 A Monopoly Model
In order to solve the monopoly model, we first solve for the period 2 demands, profits
and price equilibria. Then, we turn to the investment decision at the end of period 1 and
derive the commitment and the no commitment case.
3.1.1 Second Period - Pricing Decision
Before deriving the equilibrium prices conditional on the outcome of the R&D process,
it is important to note that the value of pu is critical to the analysis because it describes
the situation where upgrade takes place.
Assumption 3. pu > 0. Whenever the new good is produced, it is optimal for N1 to
upgrade.
We focus on the analysis, unless otherwise noticed, for cases when assumption 3 holds.
(i.e. upgrade is possible and optimal) and later on we present a brief discussion considering
the case when assumption 3 does not hold.
Note that price competition depends on the outcome of the innovation process, there-
fore, there are two cases to consider according to the success or failure of the monopolist’s
innovation process.
Monopolist does not innovate. In this case, the monopolist still produces the old
good with quality q1 in period 2. As explained before, the N1 consumers do not make
any purchase decision (they already have the only existing good) and the N2 consumers
buy the old good if the price is less or equal to the maximum surplus offered by the good
11
Monopolist Monopolist
does not innovate does innovate
Monopolist’s 0 q∆ + αN2 − cu
Prices q1 + α− c q2 + α− c
Table 1: Period 2 - Pricing Decision - Monopoly case
(i.e. p ≤ po). Therefore, given the homogeneity of consumers, the incumbent charges po
to the N2 consumers that are his only revenue source and extract their full surplus.
Monopolist does innovate. In this case, the new generation of the good with quality
q2 is produced by the monopolist. Under assumption 3 and the coordination assumption,
it is optimal for the N1 consumers to upgrade if the price charged is less or equal to
the incremental surplus offered by the new good (i.e. p ≤ pu). Again, given consumer
homogeneity, the monopolist charges pu to the N1 consumers. Using similar arguments, it
can be shown that the monopolists charges pn to the N2 consumers. Note that innovation
increase the source of revenues for the incumbent.
Table (1) summarizes the pricing decision by the monopolist in period 2 conditional
on the outcome of the R&D process. Each cell in the table shows the price charged to
the N1 and the N2 consumers, respectively.
3.1.2 First Period - Investment Decision
Suppose that to obtain the improved quality in period 2, the monopolist has to invest
and succeed according to the R&D process described above. That is, the monopolist
must decide the probability s that in period 2 the innovation is achieved and the new
generation of the good with quality q2 is produced.
21 The cost of choosing the probability
s is given by C(s) = as
2
2
, where a represents a cost parameter. Assume that consumers
coordinate on the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Then, if the innovation is successful, for
q∆ + αN2 − cu > 0 (i.e. assumption 3 holds) in period 2 the N1 consumers upgrade and
pay a price pu and the N2 consumers adopt the new good. If q∆ + αN2 − cu < 0 (i.e.
given that the innovation is achieved and assumption 3 does not hold) the N1 consumers
do not upgrade and the N2 consumers adopt the new technology. If the innovation is not
achieved, the N1 consumers do not make any decision and the N2 consumers adopt the
old good. Consider the case where assumption 3 holds, then, the investment problem of
21Note that if the innovation can be achieved with certainty and at no cost, the analysis is the one
presented in Ellison and Fudenberg (2000)
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the monopolist and the end of period 1 is given by
max
s
ΠM = N1p1 + s(N1pu +N2pn) + (1− s)(N2po)− s
2
2
(1)
with
p1 = q1 + αN1 − c+ s(sn − pu) + (1− s)(so)
In this expressions, we have simplified considering a = 1 pu = q2 − q1 + αN2 − cu,
pn = q2 + α− c, po = q1 + α− c, sn = q2 + α− cu and so = q1 + α.
In this expression, N1p1 corresponds to the period 1 revenues, s(N1pu +N2pn) + (1−
s)(N2po) are the period 2 revenues and
s2
2
is the cost attached to the innovation process.
Consider the revenues obtained in period 1. As can be seen, p1 extracts the full
surplus enjoyed by the N1. In particular, q1 + αN1 − c represents the period 1 surplus
and s(sn − pu) + (1 − s)(so) is the expected period 2 surplus that is conditional on the
outcome of the innovation. That is, with probability s the innovation is achieved and,
given assumption 3 holds, it is optimal for the N1 consumers to upgrade in period 2 with
a net surplus of sn − pu. On the other hand, if the innovation is not achieved, the period
2 net surplus of the N1 consumers is equal to so.
Importantly, note that the price charged in period 1, p1, depends on the level of
investment because the surplus that the N1 consumers enjoy in period 2 is uncertain at
the beginning of period 1. Moreover, observe that ∂p1
∂s
= −αN2 < 0. This observation
implies that through investment, the monopolist reduces the future value of its good sold
in period 1. Therefore, a higher R&D investment reduces the willingness to pay from the
N1 consumers in period 1 as the durability literature suggests. At the same time, a higher
investment level increases the probability of introducing a new generation of the network
good in period 2, and in consequence, expected period 2 revenues are increased. As we
will see, it is the interaction (i.e. trade-off) between these two effects that represents the
main impact of durability in the R&D incentives by the monopolist and highlights the
role of commitment.
The revenues obtained in period 2 presented by the second and third term of equation
(1) have a straightforward interpretation. In the following, we solve for the optimal
investment decision given the problem stated in equation (1). We first present the no
commitment case and then the commitment case.
13
3.1.3 No Commitment Case
In the no commitment case the analysis of the SPNE rules out any non-credible threats
by the monopolist. Therefore, consumers in period 1 determine their willingness to pay
considering the case of what the monopolist would do after the N1 consumers have made
their period 1 purchasing decision. In other words, solving backwards and considering
the R&D level that maximizes second period profits for the monopolist, we obtain the
following first-order condition:
0 = N1pu +N2pn −N2po − snc
It can be seen that the second-order condition for an interior solution also holds.
Thus, the corresponding optimal level of investment in the absence of commitment by the
monopolist is given by
snc = q∆ −N1cu + αN1N2 (2)
Before analyzing this result, we solve first for the commitment case.
3.1.4 Commitment Case
In this case, the monopolist is able to internalize the negative impact that his investment
decision has on the first period prices (i.e. recall ∂p1
∂s
< 0). Therefore, by considering the
NE of the global multi-stage game, we obtain the following first order condition:
0 = −N1N2α+N1pu +N2pn −N2po − sc
Analogously, the second-order condition for an interior solution holds and the optimal
level of investment provided that the incumbent is able to commit is given by
sc = q∆ −N1cu (3)
As can be readily seen from the preceding analysis, snc > sc holds for any parameter
configurations. This result is not surprising and is in line with the traditional literature.
It says that without commitment, the monopolist has the incentive to invest more than
in the presence of commitment because it does not internalize the negative impact of
its investment level on the price charged in period 1. Moreover, it is evident that the
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difference between the two investment levels is equal to αN1N2 which vanishes when
the network externalities are not present (i.e. α = 0). This implies that the effect of
commitment is completely isolated and will allow us to conclude that any inefficiency, if
present, will be solely due to the presence of network externalities.22
This result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Without the threat of entry, the monopolist invests more in the absence
of commitment than it would be the case if commitment is possible. This difference is only
due to the presence of network externalities.
In addition, comparing the two profit levels (solving for the corresponding optimal
investment levels in equation (1)) it can be shown that ΠcM − ΠncM = (N1)
2(N2)2α2
2
which
is unambiguously positive. Again, this result highlights the main commitment problem
on the R&D incentives of a monopolist that arises in the presence of durable goods (see
Waldman (1996)). That is, once a monopolist does not have the possibility to commit
to future R&D investments, its optimal decision affects negatively its overall profitability.
Importantly, note that the previous result vanishes if α = 0.
In addition, given that consumers are homogeneous, the monopolist is able to extract
all the surplus from the consumers and, therefore, the absence of commitment reduces
social surplus.
Proposition 2. For the monopoly case, the absence of commitment in the R&D invest-
ment implies a lower social surplus compared to the case when commitment is possible.
This result is only due to the presence of network externalities
The analysis of the monopoly model presented two main results. First, the presence
of network externalities implies a commitment problem in the investment decision by the
monopolists. This commitment problem is represented by an over-investment in the case
of no commitment compared to the case where commitment is possible. And second, due
to the presence of network externalities, the commitment problem implies a lower overall
profit and an associated lower social welfare. These results are in line with the current
literature and represent the benchmark for comparison for our analysis of entry.
22This result also holds in the Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) paper.
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3.2 A Model with Entry
In this subsection we extend the monopoly analysis presented above and consider the case
of a potential entrant. Keeping the same framework, we model the case of an incumbent
monopolist that serves the entire market in period 1 and must compete with a potential
entrant in period 2. As explained before, entry is conditional on innovation and, therefore,
both firms invest in developing a new technology at the end of period 1. At the beginning
of period 2 the outcome of the innovation process is realized and price competition takes
place.
As in the analysis of the monopoly case, the investment decision depends on the equi-
librium concept adopted, namely, SPNE or NE, which characterizes the no commitment
and commitment case, respectively. In order to proceed, we first solve for the period 2 de-
mands, profits and price equilibria that follow from Bertrand competition. Then, we turn
to the strategic investment decision at the end of period 1 and derive the commitment
and the no commitment case.
3.2.1 Second Period - Price Competition
As in the monopoly analysis and in order to simplify exposition, we assume in what
follows that assumption 3 holds. Note that price competition depends on the outcome of
the innovation process, therefore, there are four cases to consider according to the success
or failure of a given firm’s innovation process, and the identity of that firm.
No firm innovates. In this case, no firm achieves the innovation. In consequence,
the incumbent firm still produces the old good with quality q1 in period 2 and the entrant
firm has no production. As explained before, the N1 consumers do not make any purchase
decision (they already have the only existing good) and theN2 consumers buy the old good
if the price is less or equal to the total surplus they get from it. Therefore, the incumbent
is able to charge po to the N2 consumers that are his only revenue source in period 2.
Note that this case, ex-post, is identical to the monopoly case without innovation.
Only Incumbent innovates. In this case, the new generation of the good is pro-
duced by the incumbent and the entrant does not enter the market. Therefore, given the
assumption that the consumers are able to coordinate on the Pareto-Optimal equilibrium,
the incumbent charges pu to the N1 consumers and pn to the N2 consumers. Note that
innovation increases the source of revenues for the incumbent. Given that entry does not
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Firm Both Firms Incumbent Entrant No Firm
Innovate Innovates Innovates Innovates
Incumbent’s 0 q∆ + αN2 − cu 0 0
Prices 0 q2 + α− c 0 q1 + α− c
Entrants’s 0 0 q∆ + αN2 − cu 0
Prices 0 0 q2 + α− c 0
Table 2: Period 2 - Price Competition - Entry case
take place, this case is, ex-post, identical to the monopoly case with successful innovation.
Only entrant innovates. In this case, the entrant innovates and is able to produce
the new generation of the good in period 2. Therefore, the entrant firm is able to capture
the N2 consumers and charges pn to them. In addition, and assuming that he can identify
the N1 consumers (i.e. the entrant can offer a cross-subsidy), the price charged to them
is pu subject to the coordination assumption discussed above.
23
Both firms innovate. In this case, both firms achieve the innovation and compete
with homogeneous products in a homogeneous market. Thus, Bertrand competition drives
prices and period 2 profits to zero.
Table (2) summarizes the pricing decision in period 2 conditional on the outcome of
the R&D process. Each cell in the table shows the price charged to the N1 and the N2
consumers, respectively.
3.2.2 First Period - Investment Decisions
After deriving the equilibrium prices from the competition in period 2 between the incum-
bent and the potential entrant, we are able to analyze the optimal investment decisions
by the two firms. Note that in the case of the threat of entry, the investment decisions
are derived strategically.
As explained before, the investment decisions correspond for the firms to choose the
probability, sk for k ∈ I, E, that the innovation is achieved in period 2. In addition, there
is cost C(sk) =
as2k
2
associated with a given probability s, where a corresponds to a cost
parameter.
The overall problem of the incumbent firm is given by,
23Note that if the entrant cannot offer a cross-subsidy, the price charged to the N1 is in any case equal
to the incremental benefit that those consumer enjoy by purchasing the new good from the entrant firm.
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max
sI
ΠI = N1p1 + sI(1− sE)(N1pu +N2pn) + (1− sI)(1− sE)(N2po)− s
2
I
2
(4)
with,
p1 = q1 + αN1 − c+ sI(1− sE)(sn − pu) + (1− sI)(1− sE)(so)
In this expressions, we have simplified considering a = 1 pu = q2 − q1 + αN2 − cu,
pn = q2 + α− c, po = q1 + α− c, sn = q2 + α− cu and so = q1 + α.
In this expression, N1p1 corresponds to the period 1 revenues, sI(1−sE)(N1pu+N2pn)
are the period 2 revenues that can be obtained if the incumbent firm is the only innovator,
(1−sI)(1−sE)(N2po) are the period 2 revenues for the case where no firm innovates, and
s2I
2
is the cost attached to the innovation process. Recall that if the two firms innovate,
profits are dissipated due to the price competition and that there is no revenues for the
incumbent if the potential entrant is the unique innovator.
Consider the revenues obtained in period 1. As can be seen, p1 extracts the full
surplus enjoyed by N1 by charging the total surplus enjoyed in period 1 (i.e. q1+αN1−c)
and the expected surplus enjoyed in period 2 (i.e. sI(1 − sE)(sn − pu) + (1 − sI)(1 −
sE)(so)). Moreover, as in the monopoly case, the period 1 price charged by the incumbent
decreases with its own investment level. In particular, ∂p1
∂sI
= −αN2(1 − sE) < 0. This
observation implies that through a higher level of investment, the incumbent firm reduces
the willingness to pay of the N1 consumers in period 1. At the same time, and similar to
the monopoly case, higher investments boost period 2 revenues. However, investments in
the context analyzed in this subsection play an additional role: deter entry. Therefore, we
analyze not only the trade-off between more revenues in period 1 or 2, but also consider
the preemptive role of investments.
Analogously, the problem of the entrant firm is given by,
max
sE
ΠE = sE(1− sI)(N1pu +N2pn)− s
2
E
2
(5)
Again, we have simplified using a = 1 pu = q2−q1+αN2−cu, pn = q2+α−c, po = q1+
α−c, sn = q2+α−cu and so = q1+α. Note that the entrant can only have positive revenues
if it is the unique innovator. In addition, it is important to highlight that the fact that
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the potential entrant has no period 1 revenues, it will not face any commitment problem.
However, given that the investment levels are obtained strategically, the behavior of the
incumbent has an important impact on the behavior of the potential entrant.
3.2.3 No Commitment Case
As in the monopolist problem, this case is obtained by focusing on the SPNE. Accordingly,
the first-order condition for the incumbent firm taking into account only second period
profits is given by,
0 = (1− sE)(N1pu +N2pn)− (1− sE)(N2po)− sncI (6)
Considering equation (5), the SPNE concept provides the first-order condition for the
entrant firm given by,
0 = (1− sI)(N1pu +N2pn)− sncE (7)
It can be seen that the second-order conditions for an interior solution are satisfied.
Thus, solving equations (6) and (7) provides the equilibrium R&D levels for the incumbent
and the entrant firm in the absence of commitment by the incumbent firm. Again, note
that given that the entrant firm only competes in period 2, it has no choice concerning a
committed action. Before analyzing the results, we calculate first the commitment case.
3.2.4 Commitment Case
As should be clear by now, the NE of the global game represents the commitment solution
and provides the following first-order condition for the investment level by the incumbent.
That is,
0 = N1((1− sE)(sn − pu)− (1− sE)(so))
+ (1− sE)(N1pu +N2pn)− (1− sE)(N2po)− scI
(8)
Analogously, the first-order condition for the entrant firm is,
0 = (1− sI)(N1pu +N2pn)− scE (9)
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As in the case of no commitment, solving equations (8) and (9) provides the equilibrium
investment levels for both firm in the presence of commitment of the incumbent firm. In
order to simplify the analysis (given the large number of parameters), we consider the
behavior of the best response functions described by the first order conditions. Given
the specifications on the R&D processes, from observations of equations (6) and (7) for
the no commitment case, and equations (8) and (9) for the commitment case, the best
response functions are linear and therefore provide a unique equilibrium. Moreover, they
are downward sloping implying strategic substitutability in the investment levels. We
require and additional assumption to guarantee the existence of an economically plausible
equilibrium.
Assumption 4. q2 < 1+ cu−α. The best response functions that describe the incentives
to innovate are stable.
As can be seen, assumption 4 restricts the size of the innovation. This assumption
guarantees, in addition to provide stability to the best response functions, that for any
parameter configurations, the probabilities of success lie on the interval (0, 1). Figure 1
shows the behavior of the best response functions and suffices to provide the main results.
As can be seen from the figure, RE(sI) represents the best respond function for the
entrant as a function of the investment level of the incumbent firm. This function is
obtained from solving equation (7) for sncE .
24 Equivalently, the best respond functions
for the incumbent firm, RInc(sE) and RIc(sE), are obtained from solving equations (6)
and (8) for sncI and s
c
I , respectively. It can be shown that under assumption 4 the best
response functions lie always on the positive quadrant and below 1.
In particular, the analysis of the market outcome is summarized in Figure 1. Figure
1a shows the case where network externalities are present and Figure 1b shows the case
without network externalities. Figure 1a shows two main results. First, independent of the
presence of commitment, the potential entrant always invests more than the incumbent
firm. That is, in any case the equilibrium lies below the 45 degree line. Second, as
explained above, in the absence of commitment, the incumbent firm does not internalize
the negative effect that its own investment has on his first period price and, therefore,
invest more than it would be the case if commitment is possible. As a consequence, once
commitment is considered the incumbent corrects its R&D expenditures negatively. This
24Note that the form of RE(sI) does not depend on the presence of commitment because the entrant
only competes in period 2. Therefore, RE(sI) can also be obtained from solving equation (9) for scE .
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correction implies a stronger incentive for the entrant to innovate and, hence, increases
the entrant’s level of investment. In Figure 1 this is represented through the fact that the
commitment equilibrium lies below and to the right of the no commitment equilibrium.
This result holds for any parameter configuration satisfying the assumptions of the model.
Proposition 3. Independent of the possibility of commitment by the incumbent, the po-
tential entrant always invests in R&D more than the incumbent firm. Moreover, this
difference is increased if commitment is possible.
In addition, from equations (6) and (8) it can be shown that the difference between the
commitment and no commitment case is only due to the presence of network externalities.
This is represented in Figure 1 by the fact that the difference between the best response
function of the incumbent without commitment lies above the best response function in
the presence of commitment. In particular, the difference between the points at which
both lines intersect the vertical axis is always positive and equal to αN1N2. Therefore,
the strategic impact of entry is completely isolated. Figure (1b) shows a particular case
with α = 0.
Proposition 4. The difference in the optimal investment levels with or without commit-
ment is only due to the presence of network externalities.
Importantly, several numerical analyses suggest that, for some parameter configura-
tions, the profit of the incumbent is higher in the absence of commitment than it would
be the case if commitment is possible. That is, the threat of entry implies that in some
special cases it is strategically optimal for the incumbent to increase its R&D investment
as a mechanism to response to the potential entrant. This result is in clear contrast with
the monopoly analysis presented before and, therefore, extends the analysis of Ellison and
Fudenberg (2000).
The result that the threat of entry may eliminate the commitment problem of a mo-
nopolist in durable goods market has been analyzed by Bucovetsky and Chilton (1986),
Ausubel and Deckenere (1986) and Vettas (2001). However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no analysis that considers the role of R&D incentives in this situation and,
therefore, our result differs from the current literature.
Proposition 5. With the threat of entry, the incumbent firm may achieve a higher profit
by strategically not committing its investment level. This is in contrast to the case without
the threat of entry.
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Figure 1: Best Response Functions - Market Outcome
One of the main objectives of this paper is to analyze the social efficiency of the
incentives to innovate in the presence of network externalities and durable goods. This is
the purpose of the next section.
4 Social Optimum
In the previous section we obtained the incentives to innovate in an industry that exhibits
network externalities and durable goods. In particular, we considered the monopoly case
and concluded that, in line with the current literature, in the absence of commitment
the monopolist has incentive to invest in R&D in excess of what it would maximize its
overall profits. Moreover, we showed that the negative impact of this over-investment
was reflected in lower social welfare and it was a consequence of the presence of network
externalities.
Subsequently, we analyzed the case where the monopolist is faced by a potential en-
trant. Interestingly, we were able to conclude that due to the threat of entry, the com-
mitment problem exhibited in the monopoly case by the incumbent firm was not present
anymore. Even though the absence of commitment was reflected in higher investments be-
cause the incumbent is not able to internalize the negative impact on his period 1 pricing,
the threat of entry, and the induced higher level of investment, more than compensated
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the lower period 1 revenues by increasing the expected period 2 profits.
However, it is important to analyze the social efficiency of the results obtained in
the previous section. Therefore, and as a major objective of this paper, the present
section considers the problem faced by a social planner that maximizes social surplus. In
particular, we obtain the socially optimal R&D incentives and compare our results with
the ones obtained before for the case of the market outcome. Moreover, we investigate
the role of network externalities in the potential social inefficiencies that may arise.
Assuming that the social planner is able to produce the two goods, set prices equal to
zero, induce adoption and invest in R&D, its problem can be written as
max
sI ,sE
W = N1p
s
1 + sIsE(N1sn +N2pn)sI(1− sE)(N1sn +N2pn)
+ sI(1− sE)(N1sn +N2pn) + (1− sI)(1− sE)(N1so +N2po)
− s
2
I
2
− s
2
E
2
(10)
with
ps1 = q1 + αN1 − c
As before, we have simplified taking into account a = 1 pu = q2 − q1 + αN2 − cu,
pn = q2 + α− c, po = q1 + α− c, sn = q2 + α− cu and so = q1 + α.
Equation (10) is obtained by calculating, for each period, the maximum social surplus
that can be enjoyed by the entire population given that the social planner can induce
adoption. In addition, the assumption that the social planner invests in the two technolo-
gies simply reflects a risk diversification strategy. That is, ex-ante, it is impossible for the
social planner to realize which technology will be successful in period 2. Also, note that
investing in both technologies is an efficient strategy given the quadratic form of the costs
associated with the innovation process.
Note that for the social planner problem the SPNE and the NE coincide. Therefore,
we can calculate the first-order conditions that provide the socially optimal investment
level. This expressions are,
0 = (1− sE)(N1sn +N2pn)− (1− sE)(N1so +N2po)− swI (11)
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0 = (1− sI)(N1sn +N2pn)− (1− sI)(N1so +N2po)− swE (12)
As can be seen from equations (11) and (12), the social planner invests equally in
both technologies. This is due to the fact that the social planner internalizes the costs
of the projects. Moreover, straightforward algebra from equations (11) and (8) shows
that the best response function of the social planner is identical to the one exhibit by the
incumbent firm in the presence of commitment. This implies that in order to compare
the social optimum with the results from the market outcome we should consider the
results presented in Figure 1 with the level of investment produced by the incumbent’s
best response function in the presence of commitment. Given that the social planner
invests equally in both technologies, the social optimal level of investments is reached in
the intersection of the incumbent’s best response function with commitment and the 45
degree line. This is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2 provides two interesting results. First, it shows that the entrant firm, unam-
biguously, always over-invests in R&D in relation to the socially optimal amount. That
is, independent of the presence of commitment by the incumbent, the market equilibrium
always lie to the right of the social optimum. This result is due to the fact that a success-
ful innovation represents the only possibility for the potential entrant to make positive
profits.
Proposition 6. The potential entrant unambiguously exhibits an over-investment in com-
parison with the social optimum. This result is independent of the possibility of commit-
ment by the incumbent firm.
In addition, it can be observed in Figure 2 that in the absence of network externali-
ties or for sufficiently low values of α the incumbent firm always under-invests in R&D.
However, depending on the extent of the network externalities (i.e the value of α) the
incumbent firm may exhibit a lower (Figure 2a), equal (Figure 2b) or higher (Figure 2c)
level of investment compared with the social optimum. This result follows from numerical
simulations.
Proposition 7. Depending on the extent of the network externalities, the incumbent
firm may exhibit a lower, equal or higher investment level in comparison with the social
optimum.
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Figure 2: Best Response Fncs. - Social Optimum
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This result sheds some light on the controversy around the efficiency of the observed
market structure in network industries. As has been pointed out in the literature (and
observed in reality), network industries are characterized by the presence of few successful
incumbents. This observed structure has led regulation authorities to consider whether
the high level of concentration is detrimental for the socially optimal level of innovation
undertaken in these industries. Our analysis shows that there is no clear answer to that
questions and that the measurement of the extent of network externalities may be crucial
for policy purposes. Hence, any conclusion must be based on a formal analysis and this
paper is a small step in that direction.
5 Conclusions
We presented a model of R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant
in a market with durable goods and network externalities. In particular, we analyzed the
market outcome and the social efficiency of the incentive to innovate in the presence of
uncertain innovation processes. The robustness of the presented results with respect to
the assumed functional forms is the objective of current work.
We found three main results. First, the threat of entry reverses the commitment
problem that a monopolist (without such threat) may face in its R&D decision given
the durability of the network goods. This result is not present in the current literature
on R&D and follows from the role that R&D incentives play in deterring entry. In our
case, the monopolist’s commitment problem arises only due to the presence of network
externalities.
Second, the levels of R&D determined by market outcome might differ from the so-
cially optimal levels. In particular, a potential entrant always over-invests (as an entry
strategy) and an established incumbent might exhibit higher, lower or equal R&D levels
in comparison with the social optimum. This result suggests that successful entry takes
place too often in comparison with the social optimum.
And third, the extent of network externalities is the crucial parameter in the efficiency
of the incumbent R&D level. In fact, it is only the presence of network externalities
that permits, potentially, to the established incumbent to provide an efficient level of
innovation. Without network externalities (or very low network effects), it is shown that
the incumbent firm always under-invests in R&D efforts. This result sheds some light
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on the debate whether a dominant incumbent in a network industry provides sufficient
innovation to the society.
We recognize several areas of further research in the area of R&D incentives in the
presence of network externalities and durable goods. To reduce the dependence on initial
conditions and parameter assumptions, a fully dynamic model may shed light on some
more realistic characteristics of industry evolution inside the framework analyzed in cur-
rent paper. In addition, the analysis of compatibility decisions may also be considered
given its obvious relevance in these industries but is for the time being beyond the scope of
the present paper. Finally, a more detailed (or alternative) description of the consumers’
coordination assumptions may enrich the results.
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